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11.  Introduction
Since the early 1970s we have witnessed a growing availability of various early retirement
options in almost all OECD economies.1 In many economies these options have included a
liberalization of the entitlement conditions for older workers’ access to disability and
unemployment programs.2 Moreover, many economies have introduced general early retirement
programs implemented as an extension of the ordinary public pension scheme or negotiated
between the unions, the firms and potentially the government as a third part. Looking mainly at
the effects of the latter type of programs, we note that they have been rationalized by a
postulated need for a flexible retirement age interpreted as both the option to retire before the
standard retirement age and the opportunity to remain in the labor force for some additional
years. Data for the OECD economies suggest that this flexibility works only one way, however.
As illustrated in a lot of studies, the average retirement age has declined steadily over the last
couple of decades, see for example OECD (1998a, 1998b).3 Consequently, we may suspect that
there are significant induced retirement effects associated with the various early, or flexible,
retirement schemes. According to the cited OECD studies most of these schemes give in fact
strong economic incentives to withdraw from the labor force before the standard pension age.
The observed escalation of early retirement increases the well known and potentially
severe problems related to ageing populations in all OECD economies. Early retirement implies
reductions in the labor force and consequently a lower potential GDP. In addition the associated
increase in the ratio between the number of social security receivers and labor market
participants threatens the financial viability of these economies’ social security systems, which
essentially are financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.
This paper considers the effects of the Norwegian general early retirement program
”AFP”. The AFP program was introduced in 1989 as the result of negotiations between
employers, unions and the government which also contributes to the financing of the scheme.
Approximately 60 per cent of the labor force have access to AFP early retirement. Gradually the
entitlement age for AFP has been lowered from 66 in 1989, to 65 in 1990, to 64 in 1994, to 63 in
1997 and finally to 62 since 1998. The standard pension age in Norway is 67. As described in
more dtail below, AFP early retirement requires that some rather weak conditions for labor
market participation are satisfied.
                                                
1 See for example the surveys of OECD (1998a, 1998b) and Gruber and Wise (1997).
2 European evidence indicates that this practice tends to gain momentum in recessions, see Dahl et al.
(1999) and OECD (1998a).
3 Correspondingly, the participation rate in the labor force for older men has declined in the OECD area.
On the other hand, the participation rate for women aged 55 to 64 has been stable or even increased, while
their average retirement age has declined. Thus, larger shares of the women aged 55-64 participate in the
labor force but among these active women the retirement age has declined.
2The AFP program is rather generous in the sense that early retirement does not
influence the level of the ordinary pension benefits after age 67. In fact individuals in the AFP
program continue to accumulate claims to the ordinary supplementary pension as if they had
continued in the labor force. The net replacement rate in the AFP program, which is a declining
function of the income level, is approximately 65 per cent for individuals with a medium
income.4 This reflects that the AFP benefit is calculated as the pension benefit the individual
would have received at age 67 plus an additional ”AFP-subsidy”.5
Not surprisingly, the AFP program has gradually gained increased popularity in
response to the reductions in the entitlement age and a growing knowledge of this fairly new
scheme among the workers. Since 1993 AFP has been the most utilized exit path from the labor
force for individuals aged 64-66 years. In 1997 the AFP scheme was responsible for 60 per cent
of the exits in this age group.
Our point of departure is a stylized theoretical life-cycle model with endogenous
retirement. This model predicts that the AFP program unambigously induces more early
retirement. It also follows that the substitution effects towards early retirement is stronger for
low income individuals than high income individuals. Using a large longitudinal sample, we test
these predictions. A crucial issue, which is particularly highlighted in this paper, is to
disentangle the net retirement and labor supply effects of the AFP program from the effects
caused by possible relocations of some individuals from other transfer programs (notably
disability pensions and unemployment benefits) to the AFP program. It turns out that the
economic incentives of the AFP program induce a considerable net retirement effect, i.e.
individuals who otherwise would have continued in the labor force choose AFP. The strength of
this effect is inversely related to the income level. Our analysis also shows that approximately
28 per cent and 8 per cent of the AFP pensioners would otherwise have been on disability or
unemployment schemes respectively.
This paper is part of the large literature on retirement behavior, see Lumsdaine and
Mitchell (1999) for a broad and updated survey. It is particularly closely related to other
analyses of retirement patterns in the Nordic countries, notably Hernæs et al. (1999), Dahl et al.
(1999), Pedersen and Smith (1996) and Lilja (1996). Hernæs et al. provide an analysis of the
same Norwegian AFP scheme as the present paper studies. Based on a competing risk model
they consider transitions from full time work to full retirement or to the combination of partial
retirement and part-time work. It turns out that economic incentives influence the (early-)
retirement decision, and by means of simulations they demonstrate that a rather generous
                                                
4 We note that the net replacement rate of individuals who combine part-time AFP with part-time labor
market participation, may be well above 100 per cent due to the joint effects of the AFP program and the
tax system.
5 For more details about the AFP program see the Norwegian government white paper NOU 1998:19. A
useful and compact survey of the institutional settings in Norway is offered by Hernæs et al. (1999).
3”bonus” is neccessary if individuals should postphone retirement for one year. Hernæs et al. do
not deal with the potential interaction between the AFP scheme and the other early retirement
pathways, i.e. disability and unemployment benefits. Nor do they investigate how the retirement
behavior varies between income groups.
Turning to Dahl et al. (1999), they too consider Norwegian retirement behavior. They
analyze transitions from work to either disability pensions or unemployment benefits and
identify various push and pull factors which explain transitions to these destinations. Their
analysis indicates that disability and unemployment are not exchangeable pathways. Moreover,
economic incentives seem to be of some importance for exits to unemployment and disability.
Unfortunately, Dahl et al. do not capture AFP early retirement at all.
Using Danish data, Pedersen and Smith (1996) analyze transitions from work to
respectively disability and a general early retirement scheme (”Etterlønn”). The latter scheme
has some similarities with the Norwegian AFP program. Pedersen and Smith show that there are
different sets of factors which explain exits to these retirement pathways. We note in particular
that a higher replacement rate stimulates exits through the general scheme but not through
disability. A Finnish study by Lilja (1996) confirms that different sets of factors explain
transitions through different exit routes. Lilja’s results also indicate that high income groups
retire later than low income groups.
The next section presents our theoretical model and derives predictions for the empirical
analysis. Section 3 describes our data set, while section 4 deals with the empirical specification.
Our results are presented and interpreted in section 5. Finally, section 6 summarizes our results
and discusses policy implications.
2.  The retirement decision – economic principles
Focusing on the impact of early retirement programs on the economic incentives to retire, we
consider a simple two-period life-cycle model. 6 In the first period of life, as ”young”, the
individual works full time and supplies inelastically one unit of labor. In the second period of
life, as ”old”, retirement is possible. The individual chooses the share a of this period which is
spent in the labor force. Thus, a captures the retirement age in the sense that the individual
participates in the labor forcec in the first a part of the second period, while the last 1-a part is
spent in retirement. We assume that there is a standard ”official” retirement age a*. In the
following we will focus exclusively on cases where 0<a£a*, i.e. we consider the large share of
                                                
6 Our model has similarities with the life-cycle models with endogenous retirement presented by Feldstein
(1977), Crawford and Lilien (1981) and Myles (1995) (section 14.4.1).
4the population which retire before (or at) the standard retirement age and disregard the very few
who stay in the labor force after that age.
The individual maximizes the utility function
(1) )()()( 21 lvcucuU ++= ,
where ct is consumption in period t (t=1,2), l is the length of the retirement period (l=1-a) and
we have 0>¢u , 0<¢¢u , 0>¢v  and 0<¢¢v . For simplicity the real interest rate is zero and there
is no discounting of future utility. Assuming that the individual has access to a perfect credit
market, it immediately follows that c1=c2=c. Then we can rewrite (1) as
(1’) )1()(2 a-+= vcuU .
Moreover,
(2) )(
2
1 a= bc ,
where b(a) is the net life income defined as the present value of all net income flows over the
life-cycle. We have
(3) )()1()1()( ap+t-a+t-=a wwb ,
where w is a constant gross wage rate, t is a constant proportional tax rate and p(a) is a pension
benefit.
Maximization of (1’) subject to (2) and (3) yields
(4) bºap¢+t-=a¢¢=a¢¢ )()1()(,)()()( wblvbcu ,
i.e. the optimal retirement age ensures that the marginal gain from a longer time in the labor
force must equal the marginal gain from a prolonged retirement period.7 We interpret b as ”the
price of a longer retirement period” since this derivative expresses the marginal price of leisure
in terms of consumption. We will generally assume that b>0. Otherwise the individuals would
not work at all.
We write the pension formula as
(5) [ ] )()()()1()( * wwpyfA at+t+a-ay++a-=ap .
The first term on the RHS captures that the individual receives a flat benefit A and a
supplementary benefit f(y) (f(0)=0, 0)( ³¢ yf ) during retirement. The supplementary pension
level is determined by the number of ”earning points”, y, which is closely related to gross
income received earlier in life, and given by the formula
                                                
7 We assume that the first-order condition (4) uniquely defines an optimal a. Since )(lv¢ is an increasing
function of a, we must assume that the expression on the RHS of (4) is either non-increasing in a or
increasing at an lower rate than )(lv¢ . This seems to be a very weak assumption since )(cu¢  is
decreasing in a and )(a¢b is decreasing for most individuals when we take the typical non-actuarial
pension system of most OECD economies into account.
5(6) { }min* )()1(,0max ywwy -a-ag+a+= .
Here ymin is an exogenously given minimum level of earning points necessary to receive a
positive supplementary pension. The parameter g³0 captures to what extent the individual
accumulates earning points in the early retirement period.
The second term on the RHS of (5) reflects that the individual may face an additional
early retirement subsidy (y>0) or penalty (y<0). Finally, the last term on RHS of (5) captures a
possible direct relationship between own contributions and benefits (0£p£1).
To what extent the tax-transfer system stimulates individuals to substitute a longer early
retirement period for more time spent in the labor force depends on b. Using (5), we obtain
(7) ( ) ( ) wpyyfyfAw t+y-a¢¢a-++-t-=b )()()1()()1( .
In order to interpret (7), we first note that the case of a fully actuarial system (p=1, A=0, f(y)=0,
y=0), or alternatively no system at all (t=p=0), implies that this equation simplifies to
(8) .wactuarial =b
Clearly, the actuarial case leads to socially efficient retirement choices provided that the wage
rate reflects the marginal productivity of the individuals. If we imagine that the same v(l) and
u(c) functions are valid for all individuals, it follows from (4) and (7) that high income
individuals will retire later than low income individuals. Equivalently, if we consider
representative individuals over time, income growth leads gradually to a lower retirement age.
Looking at (7), we observe that a higher t, a higher A and f(y), a lower value of
)()( a¢¢ yyf , a lower y and a lower p all contribute to reductions in b relative to the socially
efficient level. The current Norwegian system is characterized by A>0, p=0, y>0 and also g=1
for individuals eligible for AFP benefits.8 We note from (6) that the latter feature simply implies
that y is independent of a, i.e. f(y) is fixed and )()( a¢¢ yyf =0, This means that early retirement
in the AFP program leads to free accumulation of earning points as if the individuals had
continued in the labor force until a*. It follows from (7) that the Norwegian case implies
(9)      ( ) y-+-t-=b
=g 1
)()1( yfAwNorway .
Thus, all parameters in the stylized pension formula contribute to reductions in b compared to
the socially efficient case. Consequently, Norwegian individuals eligible for the general AFP
early retirement program face strong substitution effects towards early retirement. Moreover, it
also follows that this effect is stronger for low income individuals since they face a larger
                                                
8 Employing the stylized pension formula (5), we can not, of course, include all aspects of the complex
Norwegian pension system. Still, our approach captures the relevant economic incentives in the pension
system which face individuals who are eligible for the general AFP early retirement program. We do not
capture the relevant economic incentives facing some other groups, for example individuals who stay in
the labor force after the official pension age of 67, part-time workers or professions with a lower pension
age fized by law. Clearly, our theoretical framework also disregard disability pension.
6relative reduction in b than high individuals. This is true even if we take into account that the tax
rate in reality is increasing in income (as long as the marginal tax rate is below 100 per cent).
Using (2), (3), (4) and (9), it is straightforward to derive the comparative static results
which are summarized in table 1.
Table 1: Comparative static results
A¶
a¶
y¶
a¶
p¶
a¶
t¶
a¶
Substitution effect <0 <0 >0 <0 (0 for p=1)
Income effect <0 <0 <0 >0 (0 for p=1
Total effect <0 <0 ? ? (0 for p=1
Highlighting the Norwegian case, a main question is whether the introduction and gradual
escalation of the AFP program have induced early retirement. In order to answer this question
we can not look at the partial effects of changes in different parameters as shown in table 1.
Instead we must imagine an individual who initially, before the implementation of the AFP
program, plans to retire at the standard age a* (or alternatively at an earlier stage, but without
receiving any pension benefits before a*). It is then obvious that the AFP program, which offers
i) an early retirement benefit which is higher than the regular pension (y>0) and ii) free
accumulation of earning points as discussed above and no reductions in the regular pension
benefit, leads to substitution effects which induce early retirement. Moreover, the income effect
is either zero (if the individual planned to retire at a*) or negative if the individual initially
planned top retire before a*. Formally, this can be verified by rewriting (5) as
(10) [ ] [ ]y++a-aq++a-=ap )()()()1()( ** yfAyfA ,
where q=1 corresponds to equation (5) when we recall that p=0 and g=1 in the Norwegian case).
The introduction of the AFP program can be interpreted as an increase in q. It is straightforward
to verify that 0<q¶
a¶ .
Summing up, theory gives the following predictions about the impact of the AFP early
retirement program:
· The AFP program leads unambigously to induced retirement.
· Because low income individuals face stronger substitution effects towards early retirement
than high income individuals, we expect a larger share of the low income individuals, who
are eligible for the AFP program, to choose AFP early retirement.
The rest of this paper is devoted to an empirical analysis which tests these predictions and
assesses the net impact on labor supply when we take into account possible relocations of some
individuals to AFP from other transfer programs.
73. Data
Our data are collected from a large longitudinal database, which covers the period 1992-1996.
(the “MOTIPE” database).9 This database contains individual information on socio-economic
background, labor market participation and social insurance status of the entire population of
individual aged 50 to 70. Since the eligibility age for AFP was reduced to 64 in 1994, we use a
subsample of individuals who reached the age of 64 during the first half of 1994 and who
occupied a job at that time. We track these individuals for a time span of two and a half years.
Obviously, this is the longest available time span since 1996 is the last year recorded in the data.
At the end of the period each individual is classified according to five mutually exclusive states
of destination: i) Still in work, ii) AFP pensioner, iii) Disabled, iv) unemployed or v) “other”.
By definition, these states of destination are absorbing.
We exclude individuals who were disabled or unemployed at the outset as well as
individuals with missing variables during the sample period. This leaves us with a final sample
of 6441 individuals, which we divide in two subsamples. One subsample includes 4637
individuals entitled to AFP (the AFP sample), while the other includes 1804 individuals not
entitled to AFP (no-AFP sample). All employees in the public sector and approximately 43 per
cent of the employees in the private sector are entitled to AFP provided that they meet the
requirements for labor market participation. Essentially, these requirements are i) 10 years with
income at least equal to the basic pension (37033 NOK in 1993) since the age of 50, ii) 10 years
with income at least equal to twice the basic pension since 1967 and iii) annualized income at
least equal to the basic pension in the calender year of AFP retirement and in the year before.
Looking closer at the classification of individuals with respect to the possible states of
destination, we note that we restrict the group of AFP early pensioners and disabled to only
include individuals who receive at least 50 per cent of the full benefit. Further, we give AFP
priority over disability pension and unemployment benefits. This means that an individual with
a disability or unemployment spell before a transition to AFP is classified as an AFP early
pensioner. We also note that the “other” group includes individuals who are retired through
private or firm-provided retirement schemes, self-employment or out of the labor force due to
other reasons.
Table 2 summarizes the various independent variables. We observe that three different
income variables are employed. As an approximation to the net income the individuals would
receive from continued participation in the labor force, we use net income (EMPINC) recorded
in 1993, i.e. the year prior to the start of our sample period. The net income as respectively
disabled (DISINC) and AFP early pensioner (AFPINC) is computed on the basis of the
                                                
9 This database is administered by the Norwegian National Insurance Administration (NIA).
8individuals net income in 1993 and the relevant tax, benefit and pension rules. We also note that
the variable “SICKDAYS” underreports the true number of days on sick leave. This tendency
reflects that only long-term sick leave (more than 14 days) is reported to the Norwegian
National Insurance Administration (NIA).
Table 3 presents the mean and standard deviation of each independent variable
for both the total samples and the subsamples. Except for the industry and sector variables
we do not observe any large differences between the subsamples. This is not surprising because
the classification of individuals into one of the subsamples hinges essentially on whether or not
the actual firm is affiliated to the AFP-scheme.
Table 4 reports the transition probabilities to the possible destination-states. There are
some striking dissimilarities between the subsamples. The share, which remains in the labor
force after 2.5 years, is much higher in the no-AFP sample (61.8 per cent) than in the AFP
sample (37.6 per cent). One the other hand, a larger share of individuals in the no-AFP sample
has a transition to disability pension. Moreover, we notice that a larger share of individuals in
the no-AFP sample has a transition to both the unemployed group and the “other” group. Based
on the latter observation we conjecture that more individuals in the no-AFP sample retire due to
private or firm-provided early retirement schemes.
4. Empirical specification
We apply the standard multinomial logit model for the choice of labor force status. Consider an
individual i with labor force status j, who has a utility function consisting of a deterministic part,
Uij, and a random part, ije . We denote this unobserved function by dij*,
(11) ijijiijijij UlIUd e+== );,(* z ,
where Ij and lj denote income and leisure in state j, respectively, and zi is a vector of background
characteristics. The set of possible states is J.10 For the econometric specification we write xi =
(Ii1,..,IiJ, li1,.., liJ, zi) and assume that the latent utility function in state j is linear in x and the error
term,
(12) ,'* ijijijd e+= x?
where hj is a state-specific vector of coefficients. The individual chooses the utility maximising
state, Y. We do not observe the latent utility function, only which state is chosen. Assuming that
                                                
10 For individuals who are not eligible for AFP, J includes Work, Unemployment, Disability, and Other
(not in the registers). For those who are eligible, AFP comes in addition.
9Table 2: Variable definitions
MALE Dummy = 1 for males, 0 for females
EMPINC Taxable income in 1993, measured in 1000 NoK
AFPINC Calculated net income as early pensioner (AFP) , measured in 1000 NoK
DISINC Calculated net income as disabled, measured in 1000 NoK
EXPER Years with income above basic counting unit in pension system (NoK 37033 in 1993)
UNEMPDAYS Days as unemployed in 1992-1993
SICKDAYS Days of absence due to sickness in 1992-1993
MARRIED Dummy = 1 if married, 0 otherwise
FULLTIME Dummy =1 if working ³ 30 hours per week, 0 otherwise
PRIVSECT Dummy = 1 if working in the private sector, 0 otherwise
GOVSEC Dummy =1 if  working in the governmental sector, 0 otherwise
MUNISECT Dummy = 1 if working in the municipal sector, 0 otherwise
MANUF Dummy = 1 if working in manufacturing, 0 otherwise
AGRIC Dummy = 1 if working in agriculture, 0 otherwise
PETRO Dummy = 1 if working in petroindustry, 0 otherwise
FINANCE Dummy = 1 if working in finance, 0 otherwise
CONSTR Dummy = 1 if working in construction, 0 otherwise
RETAIL Dummy = 1 if working in retail, 0 otherwise
TRANSP Dummy = 1 if working in transportation, 0 otherwise
PUBLSERV Dummy = 1 if working in public services, 0 otherwise
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (standard deviations in parentheses)
All With AFP entitlement Without AFP entitlement
MALE 0.56 0.56 0.56
AFPINC 108.4 (29.4) 110.0 (28.1)   104.4 (32.4)
DISINC 98.2 (30.6) 98.7 (29.4) 97.1 (33.5)
EMPINC 144.6 (64.0) 145.0 (53.8) 143.5 (84.9)
EXPER 24.2 (4.8) 24.6 (4.1) 23.2 (6.2)
UNEMPDAYS 12.9 (71.8) 11.0 (64.1) 18.0 (89.2)
SICKDAYS 18.2 (51.5) 23.1 (57.1) 16.4 (49.7)
MARRIED 0.78 0.78 0.78
FULLTIME 0.71 0.72 0.68
PRIVSECT 0.58 0.44 1.00
GOVSEC 0.24 0.33 0.00
MUNISECT 0.18 0.25 0.00
MANUF 0.18 0.20 0.11
AGRIC 0.02 0.01 0.04
PETRO 0.01 0.01 0.01
FINANCE 0.05 0.02 0.12
CONSTR 0.04 0.04 0.04
RETAIL 0.17 0.10 0.33
TRANSP 0.07 0.06 0.10
PUBLSERV 0.44 0.52 0.23
N 6441 4637 1804
Table 4: Transition frequencies by AFP entitlement
All With AFP entitlement Without AFP entitlement
Still in work 2857 (44.4) 1743 (37.6) 1114 (61.8)
AFP pensioner 2335 (36.3) 2335 (50.4) -
Disabled 481 (7.5) 241 (5.2) 240 (13.3)
Unemployed 263 (4.1) 106 (2.3) 157 (8.7)
Other 505 (7.8) 212 (4.6) 293 (16.2)
N 6441 4637 1804
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the error terms are i.i.d. and follow the Type I extreme value distribution, we obtain the
multinomial logit model:
(13) .:
)'exp(
)'exp(
)Pr( ij
Jk ik
ij
i PjY === å Î x?
x?
To estimate the model, some state must be chosen as the reference, and the according h j-vector
must be normalised to zero. The specification of x was detailed in table 2.
For interpretation, it is easy to show that for some variable xm,
(14) 
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i.e., the exponentiated difference between the coefficients is the relative change in the odds
associated with a marginal change in xm. In particular, since the coefficients of the reference
state are normalised to zero, an exponentiated coefficient measures the relative change in the
odds between that state and the reference state. Alternatively, by differentiating (12) we get the
marginal effect as
(15) å
Î
h-h=
¶
¶
Jk
kmkjmj
m
j
PP
x
P
).(
Unlike the coefficients, the marginal effects are not affected by the choice of reference state.
They must, however, be evaluated at some particular value of the explanatory variables.
Our main interest in this paper is the effect of introducing the AFP scheme. Consider
some state j and let the dummy variable Ti be 1 if individual i is entitled to AFP, 0 otherwise.
The expected effect of this entitlement on the latent utility function is
(16)
)}.0|()1|{()0|()1|()0|*()1|*( =e-=e+=-===-= iijiijiijiijiijiij TTETUETUETyETyE
Even if we could observe utility, this parameter could not be estimated directly, as the same
individual is only observed in one regime. But assuming that the unobserved factors ije  are not
affected by the entitlement, i.e. that 0)}0|()1|{( ==e-=e iijiij TTE , we can obtain an unbiased
estimate of the effect on the propensity of choosing state j by using the estimated response of an
individual who is not eligible for the AFP as a proxy for the response of one who is:
(17) )ˆ()'ˆ(ˆ 0,1, iTjiTj PP x'?x? == -=D ,
where P(.) is the multinomial logit in equation (12). The assumption
0)}0|()1|{( ==e-=e iijiij TTE is crucial, but in our view justified. Clearly individuals making
career decisions in the 1940s and -50s did not self-select into professions motivated by a reform
which was introduced in 1989.
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5. Results
The model was estimated separately for the groups with and without AFP entitlement. As the
marginal effects are easier to interpret, table 5 only reports those. The estimated coefficients
may be found in an appendix. We only comment on the results we find most important.
In table 5 we first note that the effect of income in 1993, EMPINC, on the probability of
choosing AFP is as predicted: it reduces the probability of AFP-retirement. Increasing EMPINC
by NOK 10,000 (approx. € 1250) reduces PAFP by 1.1%. The effect on the probability of staying
in work is exactly the opposite. On the other hand, prospective income in the AFP-state
(AFPINC) increases PAFP, whereas the potential disability income (DISINC) decreases the
probability of AFP-retirement (but, unexpectedly, has no statistically significant effect on
disability retirement). Working full time increases the probability of staying in work, probably a
result of full time workers have a closer attachment to the labor force. (We are unwilling to
concede that leisure is an inferior good.) The negative effect of AFPINC on the unemployment
state makes sense to the extent  that “permanent” unemployment benefits act as early retirement.
It may seem slightly surprising that the negative effect of DISINC on the AFP-state is so much
larger than the one of EMPINC, but the reason may be that disability retirement and AFP-
retirement are closer substitutes than work and AFP. It is also a bit unexpected that the
economic variables have no significant effects on disability retirement. We interpret this as an
indication that for individuals with AFP entitlement, there is a strong health component in the
decision to become a disability pensioner.
Turning to the effects of unemployment experience and health problems, we find that
previous unemployment has a negative effect on the employment probability, and a positive
effect on AFP-retirement. Health problems as measured by previous sickness absence
(SICKDAYS) increase the probabilities of both types of retirement, and decrease the probability
of employment.
Males have a larger propensity to retire than females (positive effects on AFP and
disability). This could be related to health status but also to females on average having less
income in retirement than males. Being married affects PAFP positively and PWORK negatively.11
The main purpose of the regression for individuals without AFP-entitlement is to
provide estimates used when assessing the effect of introducing the AFP scheme. However,
inspection of the lower panel of table 5 reveals that for the retirement probabilities the effect of
being male disappears, the effect of previous sickness on disability is increased, and there is
                                                
11 A preliminary specification included spouse’s income but this variable was dropped as it had no
statistically significant tests.
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Table 5:  Multinomial logit results: Marginal effects (asymptotic standard errors in
parentheses)
AFP SAMPLE
Still in work AFP Disability
pension
Unemployment Other
MALE -0.0624**
(0.0249)
0.0527**
(0.0253)
0.0190**
(0.0078)
0.0014
(0.0041)
-0.0107
(0.0076)
EMPINC 0.0011***
(0.0003)
-0.0011***   
(0.0003)
-0.00001
(0.00009)
0.00004
(0.00003)
0.00002
(0.00006)
AFPINC -0.0038
(0.0029)
0.0059**
(0.0029)
-0.0008
(0.0008)
-0.0009***
(0.0003)
-0.0004
(0.0007)
DISINC 0.0054*
(0.0028)
-0.0077***
(0.0029)
0.0003
(0.0008)
0.0007**
(0.0003)
0.0013*
(0.0007)
EXPER -0.0234***
(0.0027)
0.0241***
(0.0028)
0.0007
(0.0008)
-0.0002
(0.0004)
-0.0012
(0.0008)
UNEMPDAYS -0.0003**
(0.00016)
0.0002*
(0.00016)
0.00001
(0.00003)
0.0001***
(0.00001)
0.00002
(0.00004)
SICKDAYS -0.0005***
(0.0002)
0.0003**
(0.00016)
0.0002***
(0.00003)
0.00001
(0.00001)
0.00003
(0.00004)
MARRIED -0.0962***
(0.0186)
0.1128***
(0.0192)
-0.0009
(0.0056)
-0.0006
(0.0029)
-0.0150***
(0.0052)
FULLTIME 0.0604***
(0.0218)
-0.0452**
(0.0221)
0.0022
(0.0065)
-0.0092***
(0.0032)
-0.0083
(0.0060)
CONS 0.3703***
(0.0682)
-0.2250***
(0.0713)
-0.0534**
(0.0210)
0.0044
(0.0095)
-0.0964***
(0.0203)
N 1743 2335 241 106 212
Log likelihood -4664.85
NON-AFP SAMPLE
Still in work Disability
pension
Unemployment Other
MALE 0.0136
(0.0383)
-0.0144
(0.0238)
0.0458**
(0.0201)
-0.0451
(0.0291)
EMPINC 0.0006**
(0.0003)
-0.0004*
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
DISINC 0.0011
(0.0008)
-0.0008
(0.0005)
-0.0006
(0.0004)
0.0003
(0.0006)
EXPER -0.0079***
(0.0027)
0.0055***
(0.0019)
-0.0008
(0.0013)
0.0032
(0.0021)
UNEMPDAYS -0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0003*
(0.0002)
0.0002***
(0.00001)
0.0002*
(0.0001)
SICKDAYS -0.0004*
(0.0002)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.0001
(0.0002)
MARRIED -0.0777***
(0.0290)
0.0476**
(0.0194)
0.0230
(0.0155)
0.0070
(0.0218)
FULLTIME -0.0993***
(0.0310)
0.0941***
(0.0209)
0.0040
(0.0154)
0.0011
(0.0236)
CONS 0.5366*
(0.0695)
-0.2452***
(0.0477)
-0.0468
(0.0332)
-0.2447***
(0.0541)
N 1114 240 157 293
Log likelihood -1772.96
Notes: * Significant, 10 % level ** Significant, 5 % level *** Significant, 1 % level.
The marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the independent variables.
Controls for industries and regions are not reported, cf. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix
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now a positive effect of being married to a benefits receiver on the probability of becoming a
disability pensioner oneself.
Table 6: Transitions in the AFP sample
Observed fraction Without AFP entitlement1 Difference Difference as % of AFP
Still in work 37.6 54.3 -16.7 33.1
AFP 50.4 - - -
Disabled 5.2 19.5 -14.3 28.4
Unemployed 2.3 6.5 -4.2 8.3
Other 4.6 19.7 -15.1 30.0
1 Computed by using coefficients from non-AFP sample on AFP sample
Our main interest is whether the introduction of AFP induced retirement, or just
substituted for disability pensions. In part, the question is already answered by the aggregate
frequencies reported in table 4, which revealed that the employment rate is much smaller in the
entitled group than in the other. Using the estimated models, we can also compute the effect of
AFP entitlement on the entitled: The second row in table 6 shows the predicted outcomes of the
entitled group in absence of entitlement (i.e., we use the estimates of the non-entitled group on
the characteristics of the entitled group). In the third row we find the sDˆ . The effect on
employment is –16.7%, whereas the effect on disability is –14.3%. The fourth row shows the
differences as percentages of the AFP fraction: in absence of the scheme, 28.4% of the AFP
pensioners would be disability pensioners, whereas 33.1% would be working. Including the
unemployment benefits receivers, 36.7% of the AFP-pensioners are recruited from other groups
of NIA beneficiaries. In other words, slightly more than one third of the inflow to AFP is
substitution for “unofficial” early retirement, whereas the rest consists of workers and
individuals who would otherwise have been out of the labor force. Taking into account that
some in the last group might have been means tested social assistance receivers, the substitution
effect might be adjusted a bit upwards. But it seems fairly safe to conclude that at most 50% of
the AFP take-up is due to substitution for other schemes.
In table 7 we perform the same exercise broken down by uncome groups. The
substitution between disability pension and AFP is larger for the medium and low income
groups, whereas a larger fraction of the high income group would have been working in absence
of the AFP-scheme (34.1% as compared to 28.4%).
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Table 7: Transition in the AFP sample by income group
Part-time workers Low income1 Medium income2 High income3
OF WOT % of
AFP
OF WOT % of
AFP
OF WOT % of
AFP
OF WOT % of
AFP
Still in work 35.0 56.3 41.4 33.5 48.9 28.4 37.2 51.8 28.4 45.1 60.1 34.1
AFP 51.4     - - 54.3    - - 51.4    - - 44.0    - -
Disabled 6.4 16.1 18.9 6.4 24.6 33.5 5.1 22.1 33.1 2.6 15.7 29.8
Unemployed 2.6 5.3 5.3 2.6 8.6 11.0 2.4 6.7 8.4 1.5 5.6 9.3
Other 4.6 22.3 34.4 3.2 17.9 27.1 3.9 19.4 30.2 6.8 18.7 27.0
N 1267 1104 1187 1097
OF: Observed fraction WOT: Without entitlement (Computed by using coefficient from non AFP
sample on AFP sample)
1 Low income: Working full time with income < 185000 kr.
2 Medium income: Working full time with 185001 kr.< income <240000 kr.
3 High income: Working full time with income > 240001 kr.
6. Final remarks
Our statistical results convince us that the economic incentives of the AFP early retirement
scheme to a large extent drive individuals out of the labor force – as predicted by theory. Low
income individuals face stronger incentives towards AFP than high income individuals.
Consequently, our finding of an inverse relationship between income and the magnitude of the
induced retirement effects strenghtens our case.
In almost all OECD economies including Norway, it is a main policy objective to
stimulate labor supply in order to combat negative effects of ageing on growth and social
security financing. Clearly, this objective implies, among other things, that economic policies
should counteract the observed escalation of early retirement. The main policy message of this
paper is therefore to highlight the need for social security reforms which improve the economic
incentives to stay longer in the workforce. In effect this means reforms which increase the
retirement schemes’ marginal degree of actuarial fairness. In this respect, it is interesting to
point at pension reforms in economies as different as Chile and Sweden.12 The public pension
schemes in both these economies are characterized by a flexible retirement age in combination
with a very close link between marginal contributions and benefits. (Of course, both systems
include a fixed minimum pension as a safety net.) In Chile the public supplementary pension is
fully actuarial and based on real individual accounts. The new Swedish system is characterized
by both a minor funded part based on real individual accounts and a pay-as-you-go financed
supplementary pension which is based on a fairly close to actuarial concept with an individually
                                                
12 The pioneering Chilean system is surveyed by Edwards (1996). Kruse (1997) describes the new
Swedish system.
15
simulated pension wealth. In Norway, however, recent pension reforms including the
implementation of the AFP scheme as well as considerable increases in the fixed minimum
pension contribute to stronger economic incentives towards retirement.
Social security reforms which lead to increases in the marginal degree of actuarial
fairness, may alter the initial trade-off between efficiency and redistribution. It may be hard to
imagine that such reforms will not redistribute wealth and welfare from poor to rich. Taking the
intertemporal budget constraint of the public sector into account, the redistributive effects of
these kind of reforms may be slightly more subtle, however. What we have in mind is that social
security reforms which increase the degree of marginal actuarial fairness, will stimulate labor
supply and consequently increase the economy’s tax base. In turn this may reduce the tax
burden for all individuals and potentially trigger net gains for all income groups. In order to
evaluate whether social security reforms with such nice welfare effects are possible, it seems
neccessary to run numerical simulation exercises with an overlapping generations model with
different income classes within each generation. 13 This is a natural topic for future research.
                                                
13 A numerical overlapping generations model with such features is presented by Fehr (2000).
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Appendix
Table A1:  Multinomial logit results for the sample with AFP entitlement (coefficients with
asymptotic standard errors in parentheses)
AFP Disability pension Unemployment Other
MALE 0.2585**
(0.1082)
0.7145***
(0.2422)
0.2783
(0.3688)
-0.1921
(0.2644)
EMPINC -0.0047***
(0.0012)
-0.0031
(0.0029)
0.0009
(0.0028)
-0.0032
(0.0020)
AFPINC 0.0207*
(0.0126)
-0.0127
(0.0250)
-0.0678**
(0.0269)
-0.0035
(0.0258)
DISINC -0.0282**
(0.0124)
-0.0043
(0.0242)
0.0492*
(0.0266)
0.0282
(0.0256)
EXPER 0.1052***
(0.0118)
0.0808***
(0.0243)
0.0451
(0.0356)
0.0198
(0.0277)
UNEMPDAYS 0.0013**
(0.0007)
0.0011
(0.0012)
0.0056***
(0.0008)
0.0015
(0.0013)
SICKDAYS 0.0020***
(0.0007)
0.0061***
(0.0010)
0.0016
(0.0020)
0.0014
(0.0015)
MARRIED 0.4578***
(0.0817)
0.2177
(0.1741)
0.1919
(0.2582)
-0.2470
(0.1801)
FULLTIME -0.2393***
(0.0951)
-0.0888
(0.2037)
-0.9668***
(0.2888)
-0.4222**
(0.2106)
GOVSEC 0.1543
(0.1527)
-2.3765***
(0.5131)
-0.7705
(0.5741)
-2.5127***
(0.4461)
MUNISECT -0.1649
(0.1513)
0.0647
(0.3251)
-1.0682**
(0.5207)
0.1554
(0.3298)
AGRIC -0.8049***
(0.3001)
-0.7246
(0.6403)
-1.8196*
(1.0551)
-0.2988
(0.7660)
PETRO -0.2498
(0.3929)
-0.6339
(1.0573)
0.2455
(0.7095)
1.8499***
(0.4685)
FINANCE -0.4828***
(0.2347)
-0.0938
(0.5044)
-1.3908*
(0.7782)
-0.6940
(0.6285)
CONSTR 0.4905***
(0.1919)
-0.0343
(0.4668)
0.6360
(0.3982)
0.2649
(0.4256)
RETAIL -0.4353***
(0.1275)
-0.0005
(0.2563)
-1.2865***
(0.3570)
0.4861*
(0.2729)
TRANSP -0.3643**
(0.1590)
-0.2339
(0.3753)
-1.7602***
(0.6716)
0.6636*
(0.3610)
PUBLSERV -0.3665***
(0.1275)
0.2720
(0.2880)
-1.3539***
(0.4729)
0.7920***
(0.2988)
REG2 0.1916**
(0.0914)
0.0292
(0.2174)
0.3910
(0.2945)
-0.1135
(0.2001)
REG3 0.2999***
(0.0846)
0.3137
(0.1965)
0.2253
(0.2814)
-0.4259**
(0.1942)
REG4 0.1450
(0.1139)
0.6819***
(0.2293)
0.1931
(0.4049)
-0.5743**
(0.2771)
CONS -1.3693***
(0.2995)
-2.5070***
(0.6351)
-0.5573
(0.8655)
-4.1094***
(0.6706)
N 2335 241 106 293
Log likelihood -4664.85
Notes: * Significant, 10 % level ** Significant, 5 % level *** Significant, 1 % level.
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Table A2: Multinomial logit results for the sample without AFP entitlement (coefficients
 with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses)
Disability pension Unemployment Other
MALE -0.1450
(0.2411)
0.6245**
(0.3117)
-0.3163
(0.2330)
EMPINC -0.0042**
(0.0021)
-0.0025
(0.0021)
-0.0013
(0.0014)
DISINC -0.0084
(0.0053)
-0.0107*
(0.0061)
0.0000
(0.0046)
EXPER 0.0593***
(0.0189)
0.0011
(0.0198)
0.0329**
(0.0166)
UNEMPDAYS -0.0021
(0.0016)
0.0031***
(0.0006)
0.0012
(0.0008)
SICKDAYS 0.0045***
(0.0012)
-0.0003
(0.0021)
0.0010
(0.0014)
MARRIED 0.5299***
(0.1960)
0.4419*
(0.2381)
0.1635
(0.1732)
FULLTIME 0.9653***
(0.2159)
0.2067
(0.2362)
0.1576
(0.1872)
AGRIC 0.0810
(0.4042)
-1.0962*
(0.5806)
0.1806
(0.4252)
PETRO -0.0465
(1.1082)
0.6787
(0.8509)
0.5705
(0.8379)
FINANCE -0.2470
(0.3290)
-0.2143
(0.3382)
-0.3873
(0.3356)
CONSTR 0.1809
(0.3883)
-0.2274
(0.4495)
0.2791
(0.4043)
RETAIL -0.5837**
(0.2628)
-0.0825
(0.2544)
-0.3776
(0.2655)
TRANSP 0.0734
(0.3374)
-0.5534
(0.4175)
1.4884***
(0.2771)
PUBLSERV 0.7639***
(0.2521)
-1.3198***
(0.3837)
0.9436***
(0.2569)
REG2 0.5692***
(0.2039)
0.4513*
(0.2447)
0.1094
(0.1976)
REG3 0.2516
(0.1862)
0.2629
(0.2150)
0.1436
(0.1640)
REG4 0.8241***
(0.2783)
0.5874*
(0.3462)
-0.1459
(0.3051)
CONS -2.9351***
(0.4888)
-1.4707***
(0.5084)
-2.4159***
(0.4380)
N 241 106 293
Log likelihood -1772.96
Notes: * Significant, 10 % level ** Significant, 5 % level *** Significant, 1 % level.
